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SURVEILLANCE SCHEMES: THE GATT'S NEW
TRADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM
Petros C. Mavroidis*
INTRODUCTION
In 1986 the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT)' launched the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations, the most ambitious round of trade negotiations to
date.2 The Contracting Parties to the GATT agreed in the Punta Del
Este Declaration to introduce into the GATT system three new sec-
tors for negotiation: services, trade-related intellectual property rights
(TRIPs), and trade-related investment measures (TRIMs). 3 In addi-
tion, for the first time in GATT history, the Contracting Parties
agreed to devote a negotiating group exclusively to negotiating the
tricky aspects of international trade in agricultural products. 4 An-
other goal of the Uruguay Round is to abolish the Multifiber Arrange-
ment (MFA), 5 which currently regulates international trade in
textiles.6
As originally conceived, the GATT was to be the international or-
ganization for the liberalization of world trade.7 Judging by the dra-
matic lowering of tariffs that has occurred since 1947 when the GATT
* Visiting Scholar, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Fall 1991. University of Thes-
saloniki, Greece, B.A. (1982); Licence spciale en Droit CEE, U.L.B. (1983); University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, LL.M. (1986). The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor John
H. Jackson for his helpful comments, Barbara Vaccaro and Beth McWilliams for overall assist-
ance, and Michigan Journal of International Law Article Editor Mary Shimizu for editorial
assistance.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
2. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu-
MENTS, Supp. No. 33, at 19 (1985-86) (Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round) [herein-
after PUNTA DEL ESTE DECLARATION].
3. Id. at 25-26, 28.
4. Id. at 24.
5. The Multifiber Arrangement, regulating trade in textiles, arose as a compromise between
the developed and developing countries. While developing countries seek to increase their share
of the world market in textiles, developed countries seek to preserve domestic employment in
textiles, unfortunately at consumers' expense. See NIELS BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL REGULA-
TION OF WORLD TRADE IN TEXTILES 89-245 (1989).
6. PUNTA DEL ESTE DECLARATION, supra note 2, at 23.
7. In the original scheme of the Bretton Woods System, what was to become the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the still-born International Trade Organization (ITO), was to
coordinate world trade, and the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were to coor-
dinate world finance. For an overview of GATIT's history and evolution, see JOHN H. JACKSON
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was established, the GATT has been singularly successful.8 In the last
few years, however, especially in the years following the 1973 oil crisis,
the GATT has faced the proliferation of nontariff barriers (NTBs)
within the territories of the Contracting Parties. This so-called "new
protectionism" is a field in which national governments have been
most imaginative. With this new development, the Contracting Par-
ties soon realized that world trade could no longer be liberalized sim-
ply by lowering tariffs. As long as the Contracting Parties were
unwilling to go so far as to create a world competition law, scholars
suggested that one way to proceed was through better coordination or
"harmonization" of Contracting Parties' trade policies.9 However,
such harmonization requires an enhanced transparency of national
laws, law-making, and underlying trade policy.10
Although the GATT, except for article X, does not expressly pro-
vide for enhanced transparency, a tendency toward requiring en-
hanced transparency is already visible in the Uruguay Round. For
example, the inclusion of TRIPs and TRIMs in the agenda of the
Round can be explained as a move toward requiring enhanced trans-
parency. Enhanced transparency will most likely become a key aspect
of future GATT agreements. In fact, one of the few agreements con-
cluded thus far in the Uruguay Round moves the world system of
trade toward enhanced transparency and, thus, toward more effective
trade policy coordination.
That concluded agreement is the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(TPRM), which, simply stated, is a scheme purporting to regularly
monitor the trade policies of the Contracting Parties to the GATT and
to estimate the impact of those policies on the multilateral system.
The TPRM, not so much in its present form, as analyzed herein, but
in its future evolved form, will likely make a great contribution to the
multilateral system.
& WILLIAM H. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 281-84
(2d ed. 1986).
8. This success is despite the only provisional approval of the General Agreement.
9. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 305 (1989); JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 7, at 1243; see also ROBERT
GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 225 (1987).
10. A requirement of transparency in this context means several different things. The law-
making process is transparent if it publicly airs the various viewpoints and purposes of the laws
to be enacted. A statute or law is transparent if the intended economic effect is clearly predict-
able and expected from the law's means. For example, a tariff as a trade policy instrument is
transparent because its end, restriction of imports, is predictable from its means, a rise in price,
and because tariffs have traditionally been used for restricting imports. Transparency with re-
spect to national policies is simply a requirement that policymakers not disguise the purpose or
tendency of national trade policies. For an example of a proposed obligation for transparency in
safeguards in the GATT, see JACKSON, supra note 9, at 185-86.
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This article describes and analyzes the current form of the TPRM,
and advances some proposals for its future formation. The article is
divided into five parts: Part I deals with the origin and the objectives
of the TPRM; Part II analyzes the TPRM scheme and its functioning
thus far; Part III presents the legal underpinnings of the TPRM; Part
IV reviews and compares the surveillance schemes of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) with the TPRM, since it is my belief
that GATT's TPRM can draw some valuable lessons from the experi-
ence of other international organizations; and Part V sets forth conclu-
sions and proposals to strengthen GATT's newly introduced
surveillance scheme.
I. THE ORIGIN AND OBJECTIVES OF THE TPRM
One group in the Uruguay Round has been designated to negotiate
the substance of a surveillance scheme for the GATT; that group is
titled "Functioning of the GATT System" (FOGS)." One of the
objectives of the group, as expressed in the Punta Del Este Declara-
tion, was "to enhance the surveillance in the GATT to enable regular
monitoring of trade policies and practices of Contracting Parties and
their impact on the functioning of the multilateral trading system."' 2
To attain this objective, the FOGS adopted the TPRM. The Con-
tracting Parties agreed to the TPRM in the Uruguay Round's Mid-
Term Review, which took place in Montreal in December 1988.13 Be-
cause agreement was not reached in all the negotiating groups, how-
ever, the Mid-Term Review in Montreal was inconclusive. Four of the
groups did not conclude agreements, namely, the negotiating groups
on Agriculture, on Textiles, on Safeguards, and on TRIPs. Conse-
quently, the Contracting Parties decided to put the agreements of all
groups on hold, including the agreement of the FOGS group. In order
11. PUNTA DEL ESTE DECLARATION, supra note 2, at 26.
12. Id. The call for enhanced surveillance in the GATT is also to be found in the "Leutwiler
Report." GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER
FUTURE: PROPOSALS FOR ACTION (1985) [hereinafter Leutwiler Report]; see Richard
Blackhurst, Strengthening GA 7T Surveillance of Trade Related Policies, in THE NEW GATT
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 5 STUD. IN TRANSNAT'L ECON. L. 123,
125 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf eds., 1988); see also Asif H. Qureshi, The New
GATT Trade Policy Review Mechanism: An Exercise in Transparency or "'Enforcement"?, J.
WORLD TRADE, June 1990, 147, 148.
13. See Mid-term Review: Final Agreement at Geneva, 61 FOCUS: GATT NEWSLETTER 1,
14 (1989) [hereinafter Mid-term Review]; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Mid-term Review Agree-
ments of the Uruguay Round and the 1989 Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Proce-
dures, 32 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 290 (1989).
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to overcome the deadlock that the Montreal failure had created, the
Mid-Term Review resumed its work in Geneva in April 1989.
The negotiations in Geneva have been fruitful mainly because the
language of the agreed texts was vague. Eventually, all the negotiating
groups reached agreement, and the Uruguay Round resumed its nor-
mal course. Thus, the agreement on the TPRM is not, at present, a
final agreement, but merely the end-product of successful completion
of the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round. As a result, there
are certain questions concerning the legal value of this agreement.
One of these questions results from the Uruguay Round's "princi-
ple of globality."'1 4 Under this principle the Uruguay Round is a "sin-
gle undertaking"; in other words, agreement must be reached by all
negotiating groups before an agreement by one negotiating group can
take effect. Thus, although this article will show that the TPRM has
already entered into force, the globality principle requires the TPRM
to be abolished at the end of the Uruguay Round if agreement has not
been reached in every other negotiating group.
The view that the TPRM might become void if the Uruguay
Round fails must be rejected. The validity of the current application
of the TPRM cannot be contested. A GATT Council Decision
brought the TPRM into force on a provisional basis,"5 and the global-
ity principle, which is, in essence, a negotiating device that the Con-
tracting Parties have used to promote trade-offs, cannot legally
preclude such Decisions from coming into effect. The globality princi-
ple should not be given such a powerful legal effect. The principle is
more a necessary complement to the "give-and-take" process that oc-
curs in international negotiations than a legal principle to be observed
strictly. The globality principle is of greatest value when a trade liber-
alization measure being negotiated in a group has provoked serious
disagreement among the Contracting Parties, and agreement to the
resulting measure of such a group can be traded off for agreement on
another measure.16 Examples of this type of problematic measure in-
clude textiles and TRIPs. The FOGS group, in contrast, dealt with an
uncontroversial measure. During the negotiations of the FOGS
group, no major confrontations occurred among the Contracting Par-
14. Christoph Bail, Das Profil einer neuen Welthandelsordnung." Was bringt die Uruguay
Runde? (pt. 1), 1 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIF" FOR WIRTSCHAFrSRECHT [EuZW] 433, 436
(1990); see also Petersmann, supra note 13, at 312.
15. Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Programme of Reviews - 1989 & 1990, GATT Doc.
L/6554 (July 19, 1989) (GATT Council Decision) (Restricted) [hereinafter GATT Council
Decision].
16. In GATT terminology, issues that provoke the most serious disagreement are referred to
as "round-stoppers."
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ties, and the Contracting Parties reached substantial agreement at a
relatively early stage of the Round. Because the TPRM arose out of
an uncontroversial group, the globality principle should not be applied
to the TPRM.
In addition, the language of the TPRM supports the view that the
TPRM will be part of the GATT system for at least the near future.
In fact, the Contracting Parties agreed to implement it on a provi-
sional basis and, if necessary, to modify it at the end of the Uruguay
Round in light of the insights gained through its provisional applica-
tion.' 7 Finally, a consensus of the Contracting Parties approved the
TPRM. This shows that most Contracting Parties endorse the TPRM
as a viable surveillance scheme. Even the usually cautious United
States volunteered to be among the first Contracting Parties to have its
trade policy reviewed.' 8
The objectives of the TPRM, as stated in the Mid-Term Review
agreement, follow the pattern set by the Punta Del Este Declaration.
The main objective of the TPRM is the smoother functioning of the
multilateral trading system.' 9 According to FOGS, this can be at-
tained through "improved adherence by all Contracting Parties to the
GATT rules, disciplines and commitments. '20 This, in turn, can be
attained through "greater transparency in, and understanding of the
trade policies and practices of Contracting Parties. ' 21 Thus, the
TPRM's function is to examine the impact of a nation's trade policies
and practices on the multilateral trading system. 22
As stated above, the TPRM became effective in December 1989
with a review of U.S. trade policy. Since then, the trade policies of all
four major commercial trading entities of the world - the United
States, the European Community, Japan, and Canada - have been
reviewed. As a basis for analyzing the TPRM, this article will focus
on the reports issued after the U.S. and EC trade policy reviews. 23
17. Mid-term Review, supra note 13, at 14.
18. The United States agreed to be reviewed starting December 1989, soon after the TPRM
was approved. GA TT Council Decision, supra note 15.




23. All reports are published by the GATT; the national and GATT reports on the United
States, for example, were published as GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, TRADE
POLICY REVIEW: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Mar. 1990) [hereinafter U.S. REPORT
and GATT REPORT ON THE U.S.]. A comprehensive summary of the reports is released through
GATT: the one on the U.S. report is GA TT Trade Policy Review Mechanism: United States of
America, GATT Doc. 1468 (Nov. 27, 1989), which is also reprinted in GATT Trade Policy Re-
view Mechanism, WORLD TRADE MATERIALS, Jan. 1990, at 124. Regarding the report on U.S.
trade policy, see U.S. Commitment to Uruguay Round Perceived as Inconsistent with Policies,
[Vol. 13:374
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE TPRM
Under the TPRM agreement, the trade policies of all the Con-
tracting Parties will be subject to periodic review. 24 The frequency of
review, though, will not be the same for every Contracting Party. The
trade policies of the major commercial powers will be reviewed more
frequently than the policies of Contracting Parties of lesser economic
significance. The underlying rationale for this difference is that the
trade policies of the most economically powerful States undeniably
have greater impact on the multilateral system.
The criterion used to define the most economically powerful Con-
tracting Parties is their "share of world trade in a recent representative
period. ' 25 Using this criterion to determine frequency of review is
preferable to using the developmental status of a country for several
reasons. First, the "share of world trade" criterion is constantly up-
dated; thus, the criterion will automatically change the frequency of
review to reflect current reality when a nation's share of world trade,
and presumably the effect of that nation's trade policy on world trade,
changes. Second, the criterion avoids the problem of the current
method used in the GATT to designate developing countries. That
method consists simply of having every country determine for itself
whether it is or is not a developing country. At present, many Con-
tracting Parties that should no longer qualify as developing countries
retain that status and profit from special GATT provisions for devel-
oping countries. The TPRM criterion, instead, reflects current reality
because the share of world trade in a recent representative period is a
neutral, dynamic criterion. Third, the TPRM criterion is more pre-
cise; it can identify and differentiate those countries that lie between
the wealthiest and poorest countries, and put them into separate cate-
gories as appropriate.
Accordingly, the trade policies of the four most important com-
mercial powers - currently, the European Community (counting as
Report Finds, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1646-47 (Dec. 20, 1989); GATT Critiques U.S. Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1989, at D6; Trend by U.S. For Unilateral Pact is Noted, WALL ST. J., Dec.
15, 1989, at A2.
The national and GATT reports on the EC were published as GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE, TRADE POLICY REVIEW: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (June 1991)
[hereinafter EC REPORT and GATT REPORT ON THE EC). For a comprehensive summary, see
Trade Policy Review. The European Communities, GATT Doc. 1505 (Apr. 16, 1991), reprinted
in GATT Trade Policy Review Mechanism: The European Communities, WORLD TRADE
MATERIALS, May 1991, at 5; see also GATT Report Finds EC 1992 Stimulates Growth But Also
Calls for Fewer Trade Restrictions, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 586-87 (Apr. 17, 1991).
24. See Victoria Curzon-Price, GATT's New Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 14 WORLD
ECON. 229 (1991); Mid-term Review, supra note 13, at 13.
25. Mid-term Review, supra note 13, at 13.
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one party), the United States, Japan, and Canada - are to be reviewed
every two years; those of the next sixteen countries every four years;
and those of the remaining Contracting Parties every six years. The
TPRM also provides that an even longer period may be fixed for the
least developed countries, 26 because the trade policies of the least de-
veloped countries have almost no impact on the multilateral system,27
and because those countries face many difficulties in their review. For
this reason, the GATT Secretariat will, and already does, make techni-
cal assistance available at a country's request. 28
A. The "Two Reports" System
The TPRM is based on two reports of the trade policy of the Con-
tracting Party under review: one provided by the Contracting Party
and one provided by the GATT Secretariat. 29 These two reports are
referred to, respectively, as the national report and the GATT report.
The agreement on the TPRM clarifies the relationship between the
two reports. The report prepared by the Contracting Party (the na-
tional report) is the primary information source on which the GATT
Secretariat relies in preparing its own report (the GATT report). 30 If
the national report is not sufficiently clear, GATT officials have the
right to seek clarification from the Contracting Party under review.31
This procedure is common in the surveillance schemes of other inter-
national organizations, as will be shown below in Part IV of this arti-
cle. Both reports, together with the summary record of the Council
meeting dedicated to them, are to be published. 32
1. The National Reports
The TPRM agreement stipulates that the national report is to fol-
low "an agreed format to be decided upon by the Council. '33 The
agreement further stipulates that this format is subject to revision and
modification in light of experience gained in application of the
26. Id.; see also Christopher Bail, Das Profil einer neuen Welthandelsordnung: Was bringt
die Uruguay Runde? (pt. 2), 1 EuZW 465, 474 (1990).
27. This should not be understood as meaning that their trade policies are completely unim-
portant and should not be taken into account. On the contrary, they will be reviewed on a
regular, albeit less frequent, basis.
28. Mid-term Review, supra note 13, at 13.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 14.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 13.
[Vol. 13:374
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TPRM. 34 The GATT Council Decision that approved the TPRM set
forth. the format to be used in TPRM practice, at least on a provisional
basis. 35
The main functions of the agreed format include the following. 36
First, the format is designed to ensure that basic issues are addressed
by requiring discussion of those issues. The format, however, is not
intended to preclude Contracting Parties from providing any addi-
tional information that they deem useful or appropriate. 37 Second, the
format is designed to ensure that the report is current. Therefore, ini-
tial reports are expected to focus on the past three years, but should
also provide sufficient information regarding earlier years to put recent
developments into context. 38 Third, the format is not intended to be
burdensome to developing countries. Thus, the Decision directs the
GATT Secretariat to provide for those countries technical assistance
in preparing reports in addition to a more simplified reporting for-
mat.39 As far as the substance of the outline format is concerned,
there are two kinds of information: information requested by GATT
as indispensable, and information deemed by the Contracting Parties
as necessary to better explain their trade policies and practices.
The outline format agreed on by the Council is divided into two
parts: in part A the trade policies and practices are to be described,
and in part B the wider economic and developmental needs of the
Contracting Party are to be discussed.40 Part A is further subdivided
into four parts: (I) objectives of trade policies; (II) description of the
export and import system; (III) the trade policy framework; and (IV)
the implementation of trade policies. Part B is subdivided into three
parts: (I) wider economic and developmental needs, policies, and
objectives of the Contracting Party concerned; (II) the external eco-
nomic environment; and (III) problems in external markets.41 Con-
tracting Parties are invited to include an appendix to disclose
statistical information concerning trade flows by country and product,
macroeconomic indicators, and other information deemed relevant. 42
34. Id.
35. Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Outline Format for Country Reports, GATT Doc. L/
6552 (July 21, 1989).




40. Id. at 2-4; see also Qureshi, supra note 12, at 150.
41. Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Outline Format for Country Reports, supra note 35, at
2-4.
42. Id. at 4.
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One can, therefore, distinguish among legal rules contained in part A,
economic rules contained in part B, and statistical information con-
tained in the appendix. These distinctions were illustrated in the U.S.
and EC reports.43
Under "objectives of trade policies" for part A(I), Contracting
Parties are invited to explain their trade policy objectives, and to add
an explanation of the economic goals and significance of sectoral trade
policies. For example, the United States explains in its report that the
objectives of its trade policy are reduction of trade distortions and bar-
riers at home and abroad, elimination of unfair trade practices, and
successful completion of the Uruguay Round.44 The EC, on the other
hand, makes more explicit the distinction between long- and short-
term objectives. 45 The EC long-term goals include: strengthening the
multilateral system, an objective that is also expressed in the EC
Treaty (article 110); management and implementation of Community
trade rules within the Community; and support of the development
and industrialization efforts of developing countries. The stated short-
term goals include successful completion of the Uruguay Round. In
describing its trade policy objectives, each of these Contracting Parties
echoes the objectives stated in the preamble of the General Agree-
ment.46 The objectives stated in the GATT preamble, however, are so
broad that Contracting Parties can easily comply with them. More-
over, the idea of contributing to the multilateral system, as enshrined
in the GATT preamble, has different meanings for different Parties. 47
The real test of compliance with international rules, therefore, comes
only when the specific trade policies and practices of a Contracting
Party are evaluated.
Under "description of the export and import system" for part
A(II), the United States describes its competent authority for the col-
lection of duties, taxes, fees on imports, the export system, and the
export prohibition rules (i.e., COCOM rules). 48 The EC, apart from
describing the current situation, dedicates a substantial part of its re-
port to explaining the easing of import and export procedures as a
43. See U.S. REPORT, supra note 23; EC REPORT, supra note 23.
44. U.S. REPORT, supra note 23, at 19-22.
45. EC REPORT, supra note 23, at 6-8, 19-21.
46. GATT, Analytical Index, Preamble, GATT Doc. Leg/2 (1989) [hereinafter Preamble].
47. On the interpretation of this idea by developing countries, see ROBERT E. HUDEC, DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 46 (1987).
48. COCOM is the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls, established in 1950 to con-
trol trade in strategic exports. These rules apply to the Soviet Union, the formerly communist
countries of Eastern Europe, and other communist countries. These rules may be in flux due to
the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
[Vol. 13:374
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result of the 1992 project.49 In fact, the EC's attempt to allay the fears
of its partners concerning the 1992 project is the main feature of its
report.50
Under "trade policy framework" for part A(III), the United States
refers to its laws regarding import relief, antidumping and counter-
vailing duties, protection of its agricultural sector, perceived illicit
trade practices by foreign countries, and import prohibitions on na-
tional security grounds. 5' The United States further specifies its com-
petent bodies for creating commercial policy, focusing on the relations
between Congress and the Executive branch, and on the special role of
the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). 52 Fi-
nally, the United States describes the free trade agreements (FTAs)
that it has concluded with Canada and Israel, and the framework FTA
currently under negotiation with Mexico, as instruments of further lib-
eralization of world trade. 53 It is significant that the compatibility of
U.S. national trade policy instruments with GATT rules is not ex-
plored at all in the U.S. report; GATT officials are left to address such
compatibility in their report. The United States and the European
Community seem to view the purpose of the national reports to be
merely the disclosure of information. This view is justified because, in
agreeing to the outline format, the Contracting Parties assigned an in-
formation-gathering role to the national reports.
In part B of each report, both the United States and the EC refer to
the growth of imports and exports, and the evolution of their trade
balances. 54 They also refer to important trends in the balance-of-pay-
ments, the national debt, exchange rates, and interest rates. These as-
pects of the economy are not especially significant in the GATT
context, however, because they are the subject matter of the review
schemes of other international organizations, such as the IMF and the
OECD.55
49. See generally EC REPORT, supra note 23.
50. It is no wonder that the EC chose such an approach, since the two reports - the EC
REPORT, supra note 23, and the GATi REPORT ON THE EC, supra note 23 - are complemen-
tary, and countries are invited to add all necessary information in order to explain their policies
better. The EC has been the subject of criticism insofar as the trade consequences of the single
European market are concerned (i.e., fortress Europe), and on the occasion of the review, the EC
had a chance to advance its arguments on European integration in an appropriate forum.
51. U.S. REPORT, supra note 23, at 26-52.
52. Id. at 52-58.
53. Id. at 84-95.
54. Id. at 123-29; EC REPORT, supra note 23, at 89.
55. See infra part IV.
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2. The GATT Reports
The GATT reports on the United States and the European Com-
munity are more economic or political science assessments than legal
evaluations of the compatibility of U.S. and EC trade policy with
GATT rules.5 6 Still, legal comments do occur in the GATT report,
and these comments remind the reader that the General Agreement is,
among other things, a legal text. The format of the GATT report dif-
fers from that specified for national reports, since the GATT report is
not intended to present national trade policy, but rather to evaluate
the impact of national policies on the multilateral system.
In its introductory note, the GATT report on the United States
places the U.S. economy in the world context.5 7 It establishes,
through statistical evidence, the importance of international trade to
the U.S. gross national product (GNP).58 The GATT report also
notes the structural imbalances manifested in the U.S. trade balance
throughout the 1980s, and the dramatic amelioration of the U.S. trade
deficit since the mid-1980s.5 9 It goes on to explore the relations be-
tween Congress and the President in the formulation of trade policy
and the lack of statistical data concerning subsidies in the U.S. econ-
omy.6° The report recognizes that U.S. trade policy satisfies the trans-
parency objective 6l through the public debates and hearings on trade
issues that are common in the United States. 62 The report also notes
that the frequently opposing positions of the U.S. President and Con-
gress on protectionism contribute to enhanced transparency.63
The GATT report maintains the same positive tone when examin-
ing U.S. trade policy trends.6A4 While some of the U.S. trade policy
instruments are of controversial compatibility with the GATT, the re-
port describes them without examining such compatibility. GATT of-
ficials were pleased to note that in most cases the United States has, in
practice, applied the most-favored-nation principle (MFN).65 The
cases where the United States has not applied it are cited (Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Nicaragua), but the report does not
56. GATT REPORT ON THE U.S., supra note 23; GATT REPORT ON THE EC, supra note 23.
57. GATT REPORT ON THE U.S., supra note 23, at 137-52.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 139-41.
60. Id. at 162-64, 273-74.
61. Or obligation, if viewed in terms of article X of the GATT. GATT, supra note 1, art. X.
62. GATT REPORT ON THE U.S., supra note 23, at 273-74.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 174-259.
65. Id. at 274.
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examine the legal justification for this U.S. action. The report further
notes that the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences 66 (GSP) is ap-
plied on a discriminatory basis, but also notes that the practice of
other developed countries is similar.67 The report does not offer a
judgment on the then-recently concluded FTA with Canada because,
at the same time, the GATT Secretariat was reviewing the FTA.
GATT criticism in the report, while not expressed in legal terms, is
directed at the high level of protection in some sectors of the U.S.
economy and at the export subsidy programs in agriculture. Accord-
ing to the report,68 the agricultural subsidies have been greatly ex-
panded by the Food Security Act of 1985.69 The report, however,
does acknowledge that the U.S. administration has been reluctant to
succumb to the intensified pressures for increased protection.70
The report then turns to the import relief schemes in the United
States - import relief being one of the most sensitive areas in the
GATT. 71 It maintains a positive tone while simultaneously recogniz-
ing that the United States has tightened its antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws to prevent circumvention, and has introduced
stricter conditions of reciprocity in its government procurement provi-
sions. Again, the report expresses no legal assessment of the compati-
bility of these rules with the GATT.
The report then examines Section 20172 of the U.S. Trade Act.73
Section 201 corresponds to article XIX of the GATT, which regulates
the imposition of safeguards by Contracting Parties - one of the areas
of major controversy between the developed and the developing coun-
tries in the GATT. Although the report mentions that Section 201
actually served as a basis for the conclusion of various voluntary re-
straint agreements (VRAs) and orderly marketing arrangements
(OMAs), 74 the report avoids examining the compatibility of Section
66. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-65 (1988). The Generalized System of Preferences is a U.S. govern-
ment program under which imports from beneficiary developing States enter the United States
duty-free. See SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR CONSULTATION AND NEGOTIATION, ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES, CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE 8 (1989).
67. GATT REPORT ON THE U.S., supra note 23, at 274.
68. Id. at 197-211, 275.
69. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (1990)).
70. GATT REPORT ON THE U.S., supra note 23, at 275.
71. Id. at 276.
72. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1988).
73. GATT REPORT ON THE U.S., supra note 23, at 276.
74. These types of bilateral trade agreements are incompatible with the relevant GATT rules
(article XIX) mainly because they lack the erga omnes approach.
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201 with the GATT.75 Instead, the report states that overseas produ-
cers who agree to restrain exports have accrued some benefit, such as
monopoly rent, despite the fact that this issue is irrelevant in determin-
ing the compatibility of Section 201 with the GATT.
The GATT report then examines the conduct of the United States
in GATT dispute settlement under articles XXII and XXIII of the
GATT.76 The report acknowledges the overall good record of the
United States in implementing GATT panel reports, even in cases
where panels have found U.S. legislation incompatible with GATT
rules.77 The report praises not only the United States' good record as
a defendant in dispute settlement, but also its record as a claimant.78
The United States, more than any other developed country, has
demonstrated its faith in GATT dispute settlement by submitting a
large number of trade disputes to GATT dispute settlement, thus con-
tributing to the strengthening of the multilateral system.
One of the most controversial novelties of the 1988 Trade Act is
the modified Section 301, which encompasses the so-called Super 301
procedure. 79 This section receives the only legal criticism contained in
this report.8 0 Section 301 provides private parties the legal means to
ask the competent authorities in the United States to bring a legal ac-
tion against other GATT Contracting Parties who allegedly contra-
vene GATT rules.8' The report states that there are two major
dangers inherent in Section 301: (1) discriminatory application and
(2) unilateral countermeasures without a previous decision of the Con-
tracting Parties, as required by article XXIII(2) of the GATT. 2
In its final assessment, the report notes the generally low tariffs in
the United States and the U.S. commitment to the strengthening of the
multilateral system, currently expressed through its efforts in the Uru-
guay Round.8 3 The report criticizes the enhanced protection enjoyed
by some U.S. sectors and the U.S. policy toward developing countries,
especially the discriminatory designation of beneficiary countries
75. GATT" REPORT ON THE U.S., supra note 23, at 277.
76. Id. at 260-72, 278-79.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102 Stat.
1107, 1164-68 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
80. GATT REPORT ON THE U.S., supra note 23, at 262-72, 279.
81. See JACKSON, supra note 9, at 103. Legal action may also be brought against countries
who are not GATT members and in cases where general principles of international law, as dis-
tinct from GATT rules, have been violated. Thus, actions may be brought under Section 301
against countries that have concluded bilateral treaties with the United States.
82. GATT REPORT ON THE U.S., supra note 23, at 279.
83. Id. at 275.
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under the GSP.84 Finally, the report expresses the concern of many
trading partners of the United States regarding the conflict between
the U.S. commitment to strengthening the GATT multilateral system,
on the one hand, and the United States' bilateral and unilateral initia-
tives on the other.85
The GATT report on EC trade policy is similar to the GATT re-
port on U.S. trade policy, although a difference does exist in the force
of GATT criticism. In its preliminary remarks, the report notes the
EC's dependence on world trade, which is greater than that of the
United States or Japan. External trade alone accounted for nearly
twenty percent of EC Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1989.86 It
further emphasizes that the formation of the EC did not substantially
alter the trade trends between the EC Member States and the rest of
the world, although it did provide a boost for intra-EC trade. 87 The
GATT report then describes trade flows between the EC and the rest
of the world, and the differential export priorities and rates of depen-
dence on trade of individual Member States.88 The report continues
with a description of the EC pyramid of trade preferences (FTAs at
the top, association and cooperation agreements in the middle, and the
EC generalized system of preferences on the bottom) and an appraisal
of the EC's commitment to the Uruguay Round.89
GATT officials reserved their harshest criticism for EC trade pol-
icy instruments. The report examines the Common Agricultural Pol-
icy, the import relief schemes (mainly the VRAs), the frequent and
aggressive use of antidumping laws, and the heavy subsidization by
individual Member States of specific sectors. The GATT report criti-
cizes the EC's overall approach toward the multilateral trading
system.
Among its specific criticisms, the GATT report first criticizes the
Common Agricultural Policy. 90 The report holds variable levies and
84. Id. at 274.
85. Id. at 279.
86. GAIT REPORT ON THE EC, supra note 23, at 1.
87. Id. An increase in intra-EC trade can be explained through the concepts of trade crea-
tion and trade diversion as hypothesized in traditional economic theory on international trade.
Trade is created within a free trade union because tariffs are lowered or eliminated among the
Member States, allowing more trade among the Member States. On the other hand, some trade
that used to occur between Member and non-Member States is diverted to trade among Member
States because the lowering of tariffs among Member States reduces transaction costs of intra-
trade union trade. This phenomenon is called trade diversion. Trade diversion may not benefit
world welfare because Member States may produce goods at higher cost than non-Member
States.
88. Id. at 24-25.
89. Id. at 7-8, 37, 61-77.
90. Id. at 8-11, 158-85.
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export subsidies accountable for distortions in the world trade of agri-
cultural products. 91 The report emphasizes the absurdly high costs to
consumers due to EC protection of agriculture. 92 It also points out
that a majority of the cases in which the EC was involved in dispute
settlement under article XXIII of the GATT concerned agricultural
products, thus illustrating its trading partners' general dissatisfaction
with this regime. 93 The report even stresses the fact that only a minor-
ity of EC farmers enjoy heavy agricultural subsidies, thus implying
that social concerns do not predominate the Common Agricultural
Policy. 94 Although the wording of the report is not legal, in the sense
that no legal argument is advanced to support the incompatibility of
several aspects of EC policy with GATT rules, the message is clear:
the Common Agricultural Policy distorts world trade in agricultural
products.
The new EC proposals of January 1991, which the report mentions
in passing, are not reviewed because they had not been adopted at the
time of the report.95 However, the mid-1980s reform of the Common
Agricultural Policy is reviewed. 96 According to the report, that re-
form - which installed what are known as the stabilizers - failed to
rationalize the situation, producing promising results in some fields
but creating problems in others. One can safely conclude that the
GATT is dissatisfied with the current status of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy. But one should also keep in mind that the EC report
came out four months after the collapse of the Uruguay Round in
Brussels, where the major trading partners of the EC blamed the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy for preventing a successful conclusion. 97
While GATT officials did not go that far in the EC report, they did
focus more on the Common Agricultural Policy than on other EC
policies.
The second area criticized in the GATT report is the EC Mul-
tifiber Arrangement. 98 The demands for protectionism made by those




95. Id. at 19, 169.
96. Id. at 167-69.
97. See Negotiations to Liberalize World Trade Stall as EC Stands Firm on Farm Offer, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1820 (Dec. 5, 1990); U.S., Others Blame ECfor Failure in Brussels to
Agree on New Rules to Govern World Trade, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1876 (Dec. 12, 1990);
USTR Hills Says Chance of Success in Uruguay Round Impossible to Predict, 7 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1912 (Dec. 19, 1990).
98. GATT REPORT ON THE EC, supra note 23, at 11-12. The textiles group in the Uruguay
Round has been a focus for controversy between the developed and the developing countries, and
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EC Member States for whom textiles are important - that is, Italy,
Greece, and Portugal - have led to a high degree of complexity in the
EC Multifiber Arrangement. This complexity is noted in the report
along with the high prices that consumers in the EC countries pay for
textiles in order to maintain the current levels of protection.
Third, the GATT report criticizes the EC complex of VRAs. 99
GATT officials singled out for criticism three elements inherent in al-
most all the EC's VRAs. These three elements are a lack of trans-
parency, the introduction of strong elements of discrimination with
respect to certain countries and products (such as cars, steel, and tex-
tiles), and the longevity of the VRAs - despite the fact that each
VRA was originally intended to serve only as a temporary device.
Fourth, the GATT report criticizes the nonuniform quantitative
import restrictions applied by Member States on different products. 1oo
These quotas illustrate not only the Member States' differentiated sen-
sitivity in some sectors, but also the willingness of EC Member State
authorities to grant import relief for political reasons. In addition, EC
subsidies other than those of the Common Agricultural Policy are crit-
icized.101 The main criticisms attack subsidies to the steel and ship-
building. industries as well as to Airbus. 0 2
Fifth, the GATT report notes that the government procurement
market of the EC is considered more restrictive than the private sec-
tor; the report cites the lack of uniformly applicable rules as a possible
explanation.' 0 3 In addition, the GATT report criticizes some State
monopolies for employing discriminatory practices even in intra-EC
trade. Sixth, the report notes that measures taken on a temporary ba-
sis to provide import relief seem to have become permanent. 10 4 An
example is Germany's action restricting coal imports under article
XIX of the GATT. The coal restriction dates back to 1958 and is by
far the longest-standing article XIX action in GATT history. Finally,
the report notes that recently the EC has been making increased use.of
antidumping measures and has enacted aggressive legislation in this
field (the so-called "screwdriver-plant legislation"), found by a GATT
the failure to reach agreement in this group was one of the reasons why the Mid-Term Review in
Montreal collapsed.
99. Id. at 12-13.
100. Id. at 13. See, e.g., the import regime for bananas, which varies by EC Member State.
Trade Policy Review: The European Communities, supra note 23, at 12.
101. GATIT REPORT ON THE EC, supra note 23, at 14-15.
102. Airbus subsidies have been especially irksome to the United States.
103. GATT REPORT ON THE EC, supra note 23, at 15-16.
104. Id. at 17-19.
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panel to be inconsistent with GATT provisions. 105
In summary, the GATT report's overall assessment of EC trade
laws and policies was very negative. High levels of protection in some
sectors, the network of preferential agreements that in practice dis-
criminate between different suppliers, and the controversial Common
Agricultural Policy top the list of GATT criticism. The last two
paragraphs of the report, regarding the EC's approach to the multilat-
eral system as a whole, are the most critical. According to the report,
the EC's pragmatic approach could be a "major threat" to the multi-
lateral system because it contravenes some of the system's corner-
stones, namely, the principles of nondiscrimination, transparency, and
undistorted competition. 0 6 GATT criticism in the EC report seems
to be expressed much more directly than in the U.S. report.
The reactions of the representatives of these two reviewed Con-
tracting Parties, especially the reaction of the EC representative,
demonstrate that the reports arising out of the TPRM are not insignifi-
cant.107 The reactions further demonstrate that criticism by the
GATT Secretariat through the TPRM is viewed as something that
cannot be brushed aside, even though the TPRM was not intended to
impose new binding obligations on the Contracting Parties, as is
clearly stated in the original agreement of the TPRM. 0 8 For example,
Rufus Yerxa, Deputy USTR, characterized the TPRM review of U.S.
trade policy as "a useful experience," while reiterating the United
States' strong commitment to the multilateral system.t0 9 He noted
that the report had found that "tariffs and non-tariff-barriers are rela-
tively infrequent in the United States."' 10 The U.S. representative
who responded to the GATT critique on Section 301 reminded the
other Contracting Parties that the United States has committed itself
to bringing legal actions arising out of Section 301 to GATT dispute
settlement.I1 I During the discussion that followed the presentation of
the report, the EC spokesperson criticized Section 301, U.S. govern-
ment procurement procedures, the new U.S. VRAs on steel, and some
105. Id. at 19. EEC-Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, GATT Doc. L/6657
(Mar. 22, 1990) (Screwdriver Panel Decision), reprinted in WORLD TRADE MATERIALS, May
1990, at 5.
106. Trade Policy Review: The European Communities, supra note 23, at 17.
107. The EC, as opposed to the EC Member States, is not a Contracting Party to the GATT.
The EC, nonetheless, represents its Member States in the GATT, and this form of representation
has not been contested by the other Contracting Parties.
108. Mid-term Review, supra note 13, at 13.
109. US. Commitment to Uruguay Round Perceived as Inconsistent with Policies, Report
Finds, supra note 23, at 1647.
110. Id.
111. See U.S. REPORT, supra note 23, at 335.
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"Buy America" provisions.' 1 2 Most of the other Contracting Parties
joined the EC's criticism of U.S. policies, especially with respect to
Section 301.113
The EC representatives adopted a hard-line position during discus-
sion of the GATT report on the EC. In his introductory remarks, the
EC spokesperson noted that the EC is currently undergoing major
changes with the establishment of a single European market and the
negotiations on the European Monetary Union (EMU).It 4 He contin-
ued by using uncontested figures to emphasize the EC's dependence on
international trade, and he reminded the other Contracting Parties of
the beneficial effects of the 1992 project. In a perfect reflection of EC
pragmatism, he argued that EC trade policy is not overprotective, by
making a "horizontal" comparison between EC trade policy and the
trade policies of its major trading partners rather than comparing EC
rules with GATT rules. l 5 Thus, the EC representative's argument
consisted of two patterns. The first was that the 1992 process will
result in a more liberal market. The second was that other Con-
tracting Parties also have protective policies. The EC representative
made clear that the EC does not agree with the criticism expressed in
the GATT report.
This disagreement with the criticism in the GATT EC report can
also be seen in the statement of the EC's permanent representative to
the GATT." 6 The permanent representative's statement has substan-
tial legal value because it is the statement of an official representative
of the EC. The permanent representative enunciated his view of the
TPRM: (1) the TPRM is still experimental and "at some point the
Contracting Parties will have to confirm it with, perhaps, some adap-
tations or adjustments found necessary in the light of [our] joint expe-
rience";11 7 (2) "problems . . . regarding obligations should be dealt
with under the dispute settlement procedures, not under this Trade
Policy Review Mechanism";' 8 and (3) the TPRM can in the future
provide the background for assessments on the appropriate policies in
112. Id. at 339.
113. See the arguments of Japan, India, and Brazil, id. at 341, 346-47.
114. See GATT Council, Trade Policy Review Mechanism European Communities: Minutes
of Meeting, GATT Doc. C/RM/M/10 (Apr. 15-16, 1991) at 3.
115. Id. at 4.
116. See GATT Council, Statement by HE Mr. Tran Van-Thinh, Permanent Representative
of the Commission of the European Communities to the GA 7T Following the Conclusion of the
Trade Policy Review of the European Communities, GATT Doc. C/RM/6 (Apr. 22, 1991)
(Restricted).
117. Id. at 1.
118. Id. at 2.
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order to strengthen the multilateral system, but such an exercise is not
for today." 9 Although not explicitly stated, the EC representative's
statement implied that harsh criticism of the EC is useless because the
multilateral system needs the EC.' 20
Turning to an evaluation of these three points, it seems evident
that the first point is merely a conscious and rather useless attempt to
undermine the importance of the TPRM. The EC stated, as if it were
a new idea, that the TPRM will need future adjustment. In other
words, the EC representative's statement seems to assume that the
Contracting Parties intended the TPRM to be complete the way it is
and that it was supposed to be the basis of new legal obligation. The
Contracting Parties, however, intended to apply the TPRM only pro-
visionally until the end of the Uruguay Round and they did not intend
the TPRM to be the basis of new legal obligation.12' Thus, the EC
representative merely stated the obvious. In fact, by emphasizing the
TPRM's experimental nature, the statement has caused the opposite
result from the one intended - instead of undermining the TPRM's
importance, the statement has enhanced its importance by showing
the other Contracting Parties that the EC is taking the TPRM
seriously.
The second point buttresses the conclusion drawn from the first
point. The very agreement to use the TPRM as a separate procedure
shows that the dispute settlement procedure is not an effective tool for
increasing coordination of national trade policies. The TPRM adds a
significant new function to the GATT. In the second point, as well as
the first, the EC representative is trying to prove that the TPRM re-
port is not a legal document. However, when the Contracting Parties
agreed to the TPRM report, they made clear that the TPRM report
was not a legal document.
The third point is also controversial. The logical conclusion flow-
ing from it is that the TPRM should not be allowed to have a creative
function.' 2 2 The TPRM has a creative function in that the TPRM
report provides supplemental interpretation of GATT rules (thereby
essentially creating new GATT rules) by reviewing GATT rules and
making implicit judgments, however weak, that the country has or has
not complied with GATT rules. This supplemental interpretation pro-
vides the background upon which a country's trade policies can be
made more GATT-compliant, but does not in itself consist of ex ante
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See supra note 17.
122. For more discussion about the creative function, see infra Part V.
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control over national trade policies. The Contracting Parties did not
intend the TPRM :to exert ex ante control over national policies. In
other words, the EC representative has confused the creative function
of a surveillance scheme with enforceability of its suggestions. Thus,
as in the earlier two points, the EC representative stated the obvious.
In addition, the EC's suggestion of separating the TPRM's creative
function from the review function is not feasible because, as will be
shown below in Part V, separating those functions of a surveillance
scheme is very difficult. 123  . I
The EC representative may have made the third point in order to
foreclose any possibility that the recommendations of GATT officials
could be used as the basis for reexamining national trade policies. If
so, the EC would be suggesting that the TPRM be deprived of its orig-
inal, intended purpose. In that case, there is no reason for the TPRM
or the GATT report to exist. In summary, caution seems to have
guided the EC's position; the EC wanted to state clearly its overall
opposition to the GATT report in order:to avoid even "soft law"
commitments.
Finally, the EC representative's implication that harsh criticism of
the EC is useless because the multilateral system needs the EC ex-
presses the "power-oriented" technique, in international relations.
This technique consists of settling disputes with reference, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, to the relative power status of the parties.1 24 The
EC usually accuses the United States of using this approach, but the
EC seemed to have embraced it here. It is needless to say how harm-
ful to the multilateral system such an approach can be.
As a concluding remark, the Contracting Parties that underwent
review seem to have taken the TPRM seriously. Their reaction was
probably due to the enhanced credibility of the criticism due to its
"neutrality" - i.e., it was criticism by the GATT itself (a neutral) and
not by another Contracting Party.
III. THE LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE TPRM
The TPRM, as already stated, was first introduced on the basis of a
GATT Council Decision.1 25 Article XXV of the GATT serves as the
legal basis for Council Decisions, which are joint actions by the Con-
123. The IMF and the OECD surveillance schemes have three functions, namely, review,
correction, and creation. The TPRM, it will be argued, also has these same three functions. See
infra Part V.
124. For an explanation of the "power-oriented" technique, see JACKSON, supra note 9, at
85-88.
125. GATT Council Decision, supra note 15.
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tracting Parties. According to article XXV, "representatives of the
Contracting Parties meet from time to time for the purpose of giving
effect to those provisions of this Agreement which involve joint action
and, generally, with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering
the objectives of this Agreement." 126 The language of article XXV is
broad and does not specify how decisions are to be made. Because
article XXV(4) mandates decisions by simple majority in the GATT,
article XXV could have been disadvantageous to the developed coun-
tries - disadvantageous because the votes of the developed countries
could be overruled by the votes of the more numerous, but less eco-
nomically powerful, developing countries. 127 The Contracting Parties,
however, have applied article XXV very carefully through the years,
seeking a consensus on most issues - thereby ensuring that article
XXV could not seriously disadvantage the developed countries.
Article XXV states that joint action should be taken to facilitate
operation and further the objectives of the General Agreement. 128 The
objectives of the GATT are stated in the preamble of the General
Agreement. 129 The preamble reads as follows:
1. The contracting parties recognize that their relations in the field of
trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to rais-
ing standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and stead-
ily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the
full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and
exchange of goods.
2. The contracting parties desire to contribute to these objectives by en-
tering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed
to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce. 130
Thus, the language of the preamble coupled with the language of arti-
cle XXV gives the Contracting Parties broad power to undertake joint
action.' 3' Because article XXV has never been used by the Con-
tracting Parties to impose new obligations, however, the GATT Coun-
cil Decision introducing the TPRM cannot in this case be the source
of new obligation on the Contracting Parties.
126. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXV.
127. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 126-28 (1969); see
also JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 7, at 311-13; EDMOND McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 28-30
(1986).
128. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXV.
129. Preamble, supra note 46.
130. Id.
131. See JACKSON, supra note 127, at 126.
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Until the introduction of the TPRM, a surveillance scheme like it
did not exist in the GATT system. This does not mean, however, that
no surveillance at all took place. Surveillance had been exercised by
the Contracting Parties under article XXV and on numerous occa-
sions when GATT authorities examined national legislation.' 32
Traces of a comprehensive surveillance scheme can be found in the
"Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settle-
ment and Surveillance" (the Understanding) adopted November 28,
1979, as a result of the Tokyo Round agreements.133 According to the
Understanding, "the Contracting Parties agree[d] to conduct a regular
and systematic review of developments in the trading system."1 34 The
Understanding further stipulated that "particular attention would be
paid to developments which affect rights and obligations under the
GATT."1 35 While these provisions do not establish a periodic review
of national trade policies, they point in this direction.
Another objective of the TPRM, transparency of national trade
policies, is also not a new idea in the GATT. The transparency objec-
tive can be traced through several previous incarnations. First, it is
incorporated in article X of the GATT. 136 Under article X the Con-
tracting Parties are required to publish their trade laws and refrain
from enforcing a law until it is published.' 37 In addition, the Under-
standing reinforces the transparency requirement by providing for bi-
lateral consultations between Contracting Parties in cases where one
of them believes that the other has adopted measures prohibited in
GATT. t 38 While the binding nature of articles X and XXV of the
132. As Winham states, "[T]he international trade system is a self-help system." GILBERT
R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 402 (1986).
For examples of occasions when GATT authorities have reviewed national legislation, see I.H.
Courage-van Lier, Supervision Within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in SUPERVI-
SORY MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 47, 71 (P. van Dijk et al.
eds., 1984).
133. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GAT, BA sIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu-
MENTS, Supp. No. 26, at 210-18 (1979) (Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation,
Dispute Settlement, and Surveillance) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING].
134. Id. at 214.
135. Id.
136. Cf JACKSON, supra note 127, at 461-64 (Jackson states that under article X national
trade regulation must be "made public," but not that article X requires transparency by Con-
tracting Parties); see also Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, The Possibilities for National Measures
of Implementation to Strengthen the Legal Quality of International Rules on Foreign Trade, in
FOREIGN TRADE IN THE PRESENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 42, 52-54
(Detlev Chr. Dicke & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1988).
137. Lack of information on national trade policies has been perceived by one scholar as a
type of "non-tariff barrier." JACKSON, supra note 127, at 462. This is especially true since laws
regulating import and export can drastically affect trade flows. Id.
138. See UNDERSTANDING, supra note 133, at 210; see also McGOVERN, supra note 127, at
45.
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GATT cannot be seriously contested, 139 the legal nature of the Under-
standing needs some explanation. 140
First, as a matter of legal form, an "Understanding" is not men-
tioned in the General Agreement as a category of binding GATT
agreement. However, the General Agreement is quite old, and not
overly detailed, and the original Contracting Parties could not predict
what the current world trade system would require. Therefore, the
lack of such a category of legal agreement should not preclude such an
agreement from having legal force' if all the Contracting Parties agree
and intend it to have legal force.
The second and more important problem is the wording of the Un-
derstanding itself, which can sometimes be confusing and susceptible
to different interpretations. A good example is provided by its provi-
sion on dispute settlement; this provision stipulates that "if a con-
tracting party . .. requests the establishment of a panel . .. the
Contracting Parties [will] decide the establishment."' 14 This provision
has been interpreted by some Contracting Parties as the recognition of
a right to a panel and by others as the recognition of the discretionary
power of the Contracting Parties to establish a panel. 142 However, this
is not the only example in the GATT system, and even in international
law, where the meeting of minds ' or the non-meeting - is expressed
in vague terms. The vagueness of the wording should not prevent the
Understanding from being a legal, binding agreement. This Under-
standing was adopted by a consensus of the Contracting Parties, and
there is no compelling reason why the Understanding cannot be
viewed as a resolution of the Contracting Parties under article XXV of
the GATT. Any differing interpretations that arise out of the vague
language can then be resolved later through appropriate GATT
procedures.
The Understanding can also be construed as a binding subsequent
agreement interpreting the General Agreement under the provisions of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Conven-
tion). 143 The first issue is whether the Vienna Convention applies to
the GATT. The Vienna Convention came into effect on January 27,
139. See McGOVERN, supra note 127, at 55 (U.S. approach), 57-58 (EC approach).
140. See JACKSON, supra note 127, at 96.
141. UNDERSTANDING, supra note 133, at 212.
142. On this question, see WOLFGANG BENEDEK, DIE RECHTSORDNUNG DES GATT AUS
VOELKERRECHTLICHER SICHT 281, 307, 317 (1990).
143. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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1980.'" Article 4 of the Vienna Convention states that the articles of
the Vienna Convention have no retroactive force. 145 Article 4 is, how-
ever, "without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the
present Convention to which treaties would be subject under interna-
tional law independently of the Convention."1 46 Thus, any articles of
the Vienna Convention that codify existing customary international
law will apply to treaties that came into force before 1980. Even coun-
tries that have not ratified the Vienna Convention, such as the United
States, are bound by those Vienna Convention articles that codify cus-
tomary international law.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention147 addresses the legal value of
subsequent agreements - agreements among treaty signatories con-
cluded after the conclusion of a treaty. 48 Article 31 is widely believed
to be a codification of customary international law, and the voting on
article 31 leaves no doubt: the vote agreeing that this article codified
customary international law was unanimous.149 The claim of codifica-
tion is also buttressed by the fact that the United States, during the
preparatory work of the Vienna Convention, argued that subsequent
agreements constitute objective evidence of the understanding of the
parties as to the meaning of treaties. 50
According to article 31(3)(a), "any subsequent agreement between
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application
of its provisions" shall be taken into account along with the context of
the treaty. 151 Agreements between parties subsequent to the conclu-
sion of a treaty often purport to produce a commonly acceptable inter-
pretation of the treaty.152 In the ever-changing world of international
144. IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 1, 45 (2d ed.
1984).
145. Vienna Convention, supra note 143, art. 4, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 334, 8 I.L.M. at 682.
146. SINCLAIR, supra note 144, at 7.
147. Vienna Convention, supra note 143, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340, 8 I.L.M. at 691-92.
148. Georg Ress, Die Bedeutung der nachfolgenden Praxis fir die Vertragsinterpretation nach
der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention, in DIE DYNAMIK DER EUROPASCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT-
SRECHTs 49, 51-52 (Roland Bieber & Georg Ress eds., 1987).
149. RALF G. WETZEL & DIETRICH RAUSCHNING, DIE WIENER VERTRAGSRECHT-
SKONVENTION: MATERIALIEN ZUR ENTSTEHUNG DER EINZELNEN VORSCHRIFTEN 243 (1978).
150. See JACKSON, supra note 9, at 88; Myres McDougal, The International Law Commis-
sion's Draft Articles Upon Interpretation: Textuality Redivivus, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 992, 994
(1967); see also WETZEL & RAUSCHNING, supra note 149, at 243.
151. Vienna Convention, supra note 143, art. 31(3)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340, 8 I.L.M. at 692;
see Richard Falk, On Treaty Interpretation and the New Haven Approach: Achievements and
Prospects, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 323, 343 (1968).
152. According to Bernhard, subsequent agreements constitute a dynamic element in treaty
interpretation. Rudolf Bernhard, Interpretation and Implied (Tacit) Modification of Treaties,
Comments on Arts. 27, 28, 29 and 38 of the ILC's 1968 Draft Articles on the Law of the Treaties,
27 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT 491, 499
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economic relations, subsequent understandings are of crucial impor-
tance as a means to adjust the original treaty provisions to modem
reality. Quick and effective adjustment is especially necessary in the
GATT due to the GATT's defective structure.1 53 The Understanding
is a subsequent agreement concluded by the Contracting Parties (sub-
sequent, that is, to conclusion of the General Agreement itself); there-
fore it should be considered a subsequent agreement in the terms of
article 31 of the Vienna Convention and should be accepted as a valid
legal interpretation of the provisions of the General Agreement.
This analysis so far has shown the historical and legal background
of the TPRM, and on this score, one final point should be made.
Namely, the TPRM should be clearly distinguished from GATT dis-
pute settlement, which the TPRM was not intended to replace. 154 At
least two reasons, besides the intent of the parties, dictate this conclu-
sion. First, while dispute settlement is initiated by a Contracting
Party's complaint, the TPRM is not; and while in dispute settlement
an ex officio complaint is unknown, in the TPRM the review is con-
ducted by GATT officials. Second, while a decision arising out of
GATT dispute settlement serves as the basis for a legal obligation
binding on the Contracting Party, the reports arising out of the TPRM
were not intended to serve as a basis for enforcement of GATT
obligations.
Although the TPRM was not intended to impose new GATT obli-
gations, because of the continuity that seems to exist among article X
of the GATT, the Understanding, and the TPRM, an argument can be
made that the adoption of the TPRM imposes an obligation upon the
Contracting Parties to undergo TPRM review. This argument lacks
merit for several reasons. On its face, the language of the TPRM does
not indicate an obligation for the Contracting Parties to undergo re-
view. Moreover, the General Agreement does not require Contracting
Parties to cooperate with the GATT.155
However, the Contracting Parties, including the major trading
powers in the GATT, adopted the TPRM by a broad consensus, and it
(1967). Such understandings also perform another function; they establish the compatibility of
national instruments with the provisions of a treaty. See Winfried Lang, Les rigles
d'interpritation codifiies par la Convention de Vienne sur le Droit des Traitis et les divers types de
traitis, 24 OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFF FOR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 113, 135 (1973).
153. The failed Havana Charter for the ITO was much more detailed in structure.
154. For discussion of GATT dispute settlement, see GATT, Analytical Index, arts. XXII-I
& XXIII-1, GATT Doc. Leg/2 (1989).
155. An obligation to cooperate does exist, however, in other international organizations,
such as the IMF and the EC. See infra Parts IV & V.
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would be inconsistent 56 for those Contracting Parties that urged its
introduction and were subject to its review to refuse to submit to re-
view in the future, provided that the TPRM maintains its current
form. Such inconsistencies, however, are not unknown in the sphere
of international economic relations. Contracting Parties behaving this
way in the GATT become the subjects' of "finger-pointing."' 5 7
IV. THE IMF AND OECD SCHEMES
Examination and comparison of the surveillance schemes of the
IMF and the OECD to the TPRM is useful for several reasons. The
IMF surveillance scheme makes for an illuminating comparison be-
cause the IMF is a sort of sister institution to the GATT, both institu-
tions being pillars of the Bretton Woods System.158 It is helpful to
examine the OECD surveillance scheme, too, because the OECD exer-
cises competence on the same subject matter as the GATT, that is,
Member States' trade policies.
The differences between these two organizations and the GATT
are numerous. The most important difference between the IMF and
the GATT is subject matter: the IMF deals with national monetary
policy and the GATT with trade policy. Monetary policy and trade
policy are, however, closely interrelated. The OECD and the GATT
are different because, aside from the broader subject matter of the for-
mer, the OECD is a forum exclusively for developed countries, while
the GATT consists mostly of developing countries. 59 One might ar-
gue that the greater dependence of IMF Members on the IMF or the
increased homogeneity among Member States of the OECD makes in-
appropriate a comparison of the review schemes of these institutions
with the TPRM. These differences, however, explain only the
TPRM's delayed introduction into the GATT. In addition, these
comparisons are beneficial because the form of the TPRM has un-
doubtedly been influenced by the forms of the surveillance schemes of
the other international organizations, and the TPRM can only benefit
from the reforms such schemes have undergone through the years.
156. On the notion of inconsistency, see Hans Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct
for MNEs, in 1 STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 3, 36-37 (Norbert Horn ed.,
1980).
157. See JACKSON, supra note 127, at 176 (discussing "finger-pointing" in the context of
GATI dispute settlement).
158. Id. at 40-41.
159. As Jackson has said, the OECD is a "forum for discussion and future negotiation."
John H. Jackson, Reflections on Restructuring the GATT, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY
ROUND: A RESULTS-ORIENTED APPROACH TO THE GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 210 (Jeffrey
J. Schott ed., 1990).
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Article IV of the IMF agreement160 constitutes the main legal pil-
lar of the IMF surveillance scheme. 161 The Articles of Agreement of
the IMF were modified following the 1971 U.S. decision to abandon
the fixed exchange rate system. The present article IV became effec-
tive April 1, 1978.162 Before the establishment of the Bretton Woods
System over fifty years ago, every State was entitled to regulate its own
currency, according to the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of
International Justice. 63 The Bretton Woods conference that estab-
lished the IMF put into place a system of stable exchange rates among
countries. 64 This system collapsed on August 15, 1971, when U.S.
President Nixon unilaterally and without prior consultation an-
nounced that the United States would no longer convert foreign-held
dollars into gold.' 65 The fixed exchange rate system was replaced by
the current system, which is a compromise between a "system of stable
exchange rates" and a "stable system of exchange rates."' 66
The new article IV, section 1 of the IMF stipulates that "each
member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund to promote exchange
stability."' 67 The wording of this article leaves no room for dispute
concerning its legal meaning: the term "undertakes" creates an obli-
gation for the IMF Members to conduct consultations with the Fund
in order to promote IMF objectives. In short, there is a duty to
collaborate.' 68
Why is such a provision necessary? Why should countries be obli-
160. Second Amendment to the Articles of the Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, opened for signature Apr. 30, 1976, art. IV, 29 U.S.T. 2203, 2208 (entered into force Apr.
1-10, 1978) [hereinafter IMF Agreement].
161. For an overview of the IMF surveillance scheme, see KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES
OF THE GAME: REFORM AND EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 259-
67 (1982); RICHARD W. EDWARDS, JR., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 558
(1985); R. Barents, Supervision within the International Monetary Fund, in SUPERVISORY MECH-
ANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 132, at 351, 370.
162. See EDWARDS, supra note 161, at 527. On the history of article IV and its consecutive
draftings, see Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements,
77 AM. J. INT'L L. 452 (1983).
163. See France v. Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 1929 P.C.I.J. 44 (ser. A) No. 20/
21 (July 12) (case concerning the payment of various Serbian loans issued in France).
164. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 19 (Int'l
Econ. L. vol. 4, 2d ed., 1984).
165. Id. at 128.
166. The modification of the Articles of the Agreement of the IMF that followed the U.S.
decision to abandon fixed exchange rates was a compromise between those countries that favored
floating exchange rates (such as the United States) and those countries that wanted to return to
the Bretton Woods System of stable exchange rates (mainly France). See EDWARDS, supra note
161, at 505.
167. IMF Agreement, supra note 160, art. IV, 29 U.S.T. at 2208.
168. See EDWARDS, supra note 161, at 508; JOSEPH GOLD, THE SECOND AMENDMENT OF
THE FUND'S ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT 26 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 25, 1978); JOSEPH GOLD,
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SELECTED Es-
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gated to cooperate with the competent authorities of the international
organizations they join? After all, countries voluntarily join organiza-
tions, and accordingly, the organization's objectives should coincide
with national objectives. Thus, the issue of collaboration should never
arise. Modern history, however, has shown that international organi-
zations do require a duty to cooperate in order to function effectively.
Such a duty to cooperate is especially needed in GATT, where the
prevailing pragmatism of individual Contracting Parties has often run
counter to cooperation with GATT. In international organizations
that are more integrated than GATT, such as the EC, the collabora-
tion requirement is a strict legal obligation. 169
Such a strict legal formulation of the obligation to collaborate is
unknown in the IMF. Still, the legal significance of article IV of the
IMF cannot be overlooked. 170 Article IV(l) further elaborates the
duty to cooperate as follows:
In particular, each member shall:
i. endeavour to direct its economic and financial policies toward the
objective of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price sta-
bility, with due regard to its circumstances;
ii. seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic
and financial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to
produce erratic disruptions;
iii. avoid manipulating exchange rates of the international monetary
system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to
gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members; and
iv. follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings under
this section.'
71
SAYS 390 (1979); JOSEPH GOLD, THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND 23 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 32, 1982); Barents, supra note 161, at 387, 391-92.
169. Although the EC is not altogether apposite, since it is unique and more like a nation
State than an international organization, it is useful to explore the legal nature of the EC's duty
to cooperate. Member States are obligated by the EC treaty to cooperate through positive action
(adopting appropriate measures) and negative action (omitting actions that hinder realization of
the objectives of the EC treaty). See John T. Lang, Community Constitutional Law: Article 5
EEC Treaty, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 645 (1990). Vlad Constatinesco has stated that article 5
of the EEC Treaty embodies "the principle of cooperation." Vlad Constatinesco, L'article 5
CEE, de la bonnefoi d la loyaute communautaire, in LIBER AMICORUM PIERRE PESCATORE, Du
DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L'INTEGRATION 114 (1987). EC Member States are
themselves involved in the process of EC supervision. See H.A.H. AUDRETSCH, SUPERVISION IN
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 231 (1986).
If a Member State violates this obligation, the EC Commission can proceed with legal action
against the violating State according to the procedure described in article 169 of the EC treaty.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 169, opened for signature Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11; see HANS VON DER GROEBEN ET AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG VER-
TRAG 90 (1974) (description of EC procedure under article 169); see also I JACQUES MEGRET ET
AL., I LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE 19.
170. IMF Agreement, supra note 160, art. IV, 29 U.S.T. at 2208.
171. Id.
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The duty to collaborate is thus divided into specific legal obligations
that the Members of the IMF must observe.1 72
Using information provided by Members of the IMF under article
IV(2)-(3) of the IMF Agreement, the Fund exercises "firm surveil-
lance over the exchange rate policies of members, and .. .adopt[s]
specific principles for the guidance with respect to those policies. 1 73
As a consequence, the IMF has adopted specific criteria appropriate
for assessing the compatibility of national measures with IMF obliga-
tions under article IV.' 74 The surveillance powers entrusted to the
IMF are broad; 75 in practice, however, Members tend to interpret
IMF articles very narrowly.' 76
To facilitate surveillance, the IMF periodically reviews national
policies. According to a decision of the Executive Board on surveil-
lance over exchange rate policies, Members should annually provide
the Fund with the necessary information and consult with the
Fund. 177 In practice, because of the large and ever-increasing number
of IMF Members, the Fund is able to conduct only between ninety
and one hundred consultations per year. 7  This means that every
Member has its exchange rate policy reviewed approximately every
eighteen months. An outline format, now a long-standing practice in
the IMF system, serves as the basis for consultations between Mem-
bers and the Fund. 79
Strict conditions govern a Member's application for and use of
IMF funds; specifically, the famous IMF-conditionality restricts use of
IMF funds.'8 0 In the area of stand-by arrangements,' 8 ' according to
article XXX(B), the IMF follows a strict procedure: the Member that
172. According to Gianviti, article IV(l) imposes on the Members obligations of conduct [(i)
and (ii)] and obligations of result [(iii) and (iv)]. See Frangois Gianviti, The International Mone-
tary Fund and External Debt, 1989 R.C.A.D.I. 250, 267-69.
173. IMF Agreement, supra note 160, art. IV(3), 29 U.S.T. at 2209.
174. See EDWARDS, supra note 161, at 521-31.
175. Cf Stephen A. Silard, Exchange Controls and Exchange Indebtedness. Are the Bretton
Woods Concepts Still Workable? A Perspective from the International Monetary Fund, 7 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 68-69 (1984).
176. See Stephen Zamora, Recognition of Foreign Exchange Controls in International Credi-
tors' Rights Cases: The State of the Art, 21 INT'L LAW. 1064-65 (1987).
177. Decision on Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies, no. 5392-(77/63) (Apr. 29,
1977), reprinted in LOWENFELD, supra note 164, at 511.
178. Currently 155 countries are members of the IMF, while the USSR has recently depos-
ited its application for membership. The Wolf at the Door, ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 1991, at 63. The
new emerging States of the former USSR will also probably apply.
179. Barents, supra note 161, at 372.
180. On its rationale, see MANUEL GUITIAN, FUND CONDITIONALITY, EVOLUTION OF
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 2 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 38, 1981); see also A.W. HOOKE, THE




is asking for funds must submit a letter of intent to the IMF describing
what national policies will be pursued and what funds are needed to
support these policies.18 2 In order to draw funds, IMF Members must
respect certain performance criteria. As Barents states, "Performance
criteria... are certain policies, targets or intentions which a member
states that it will observe and on the observance of which the mem-
ber's right to purchase has been made to depend."18 3 In cases where it
seems unlikely that the performance criteria will be met, additional
consultations take place between the Member and IMF officials mid-
way through the stand-by arrangement to discuss the Member's com-
pliance with the performance criteria. At this time the Member is
allowed to offer explanations. Usually, the funds are continued even if
the Member is not perfectly compliant with the criteria.1 84 The
Fund's legally binding decision on whether to extend funds is based on
the Member's letter of intent and the Member's likelihood of meeting
the performance criteria.8 5
The Members of the IMF have, on the whole, respected their obli-
gations. Members have rarely engaged in exchange rate manipulations
that contravene IMF articles without prior consultation with the com-
petent authorities. 8 6 Generally, in the words of former managing di-
rector of the IMF H. Johannes Witteveen, Members of the IMF have
"a freedom of choice, but not a freedom of behavior."' 8 7 Thus, the
above analysis has shown that the IMF has both relatively strict sur-
veillance mechanisms, as seen in the procedures for IMF monitoring
of exchange rate policies and for controlling the use of IMF funds, and
a relatively strict and formal obligation on Members to cooperate with
IMF authorities.
An examination of the OECD scheme is primarily of interest be-
cause, as stated above, the OECD has exercised some GATT compe-
18 1. A stand-by arrangement is an agreement between the IMF and a Member to loan funds
to the Member conditional to respecting certain performance criteria.
182. IMF Agreement, supra note 160, arts. IV & XXX(B), 29 U.S.T. at 2208-09, 2257; see
Barents, supra note 161, at 388-89.
183. JOSEPH GOLD, THE STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND 140 (1970).
184. See JOSEPH GOLD, THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE FUND'S STAND-BY ARRANGE-
MENTS AND WHY IT MATTERS 27, 31-38 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 35, 1980).
185. See Barents, supra note 161, at 388.
186. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 161, at 606 (discussing the devaluation of Sweden's
currency).
187. H. Johannes Witteveen, The Emerging International Monetary System, Address Before
the International Monetary Conference, 5 IMF SURVEY 180 (1976); see also Stephan Haggard,
The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF's Extended Fund Facility, 39 INT'L ORG. 505
(1985).
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tencies by reviewing the trade policies of its Member States. 18
Furthermore, the OECD has chosen a "soft" approach to review of
Member States' economic policies, and this approach seems to have
influenced the GATT TPRM.
The OECD came into being by replacing the Organisation for Eu-
ropean Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which consisted only of Euro-
pean countries. 89 Currently, the OECD includes the United States,
Canada, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand in addition to the EC
Member States, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Mem-
ber States, and Turkey. Unlike the IMF and the GATT, OECD
Members form a relatively homogeneous group; essentially it is a
"club" consisting of the economically wealthiest countries of the
world. Among the objectives of this "club" is the expansion of world
trade. 190 Article l(c) of the OECD Convention stipulates the organi-
zation's intent "to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a
multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international
obligations."' 9' However, the OECD complements rather than substi-
tutes for the GATT; the OECD is more "a forum for the exchange of
informed views on policy questions," and "an international economic
conference in permanent session" than a regulatory body like the
GATT.
192
According to article 5 of the OECD Convention, 93 the OECD
may make decisions, which are binding on its Members, as well as
recommendations, which are not binding. 94 In its supervision
scheme, the OECD issues only recommendations. In other words, the
OECD, after reviewing a Member State's national policy, will not is-
sue a decision that requires the Member to comply with its directives.
It will instead recommend certain policies or modifications in order
for national policy to attain the objectives of the OECD. The working
188. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT 386 (1970) (arguing that the OECD's reviews
have not had much impact on national policies).
189. On the history of the OECD, see HUGO J. HAHN & ALBRECHT WEBER, DIE OECD,
ORGANISATION FOR WIRTSCHAFTLICHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT UND ENTWICKLUNG (1976); A. H.
ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS: COOPERATION, INTEGRATION, UNIFICATION 27-29
(3d ed. 1973); Hugo J. Hahn, La Reconstitution de l'OECE et so Continuation dans I'OCDE,
ANNUAIRE FRAN AIS DE DROIT INT'L 751-62 (1962).
190. See Thorkil Kristensen, L 'Organisation de coopirotion et de developpement iconomique,
ses origines, ses buts, sa structure, 1962 IX EUR. Y.B. 42.
191. The OECD Convention is published in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
43, 45 (1963), reprinted in ROBERTSON, supra note 189, at 322 [hereinafter Convention].
192. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD AT
WORK 6, 42 (1964).
193. Convention, supra note 191, art. 5.
194. HAHN & WEBER, supra note 189, at 99.
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sphere at the OECD, as stated by one learned scholar, is efficient and
informal, thereby encouraging effectiveness. 195
The OECD supervision scheme has succeeded primarily because of
two factors. First, the economic surveys published by the OECD are
considered to be very good and, thus, OECD forecasting is respect-
fully considered by interested parties. Second, being aware of the re-
ception the OECD surveys have in world financial circles, countries
under review try to comply with the recommendations of the OECD
in order to attract investment. Before examining the OECD review
schemes, it should be noted that the OECD does not impose sanctions
when Member States do not comply with the recommendations of the
reviewing body.196 Thus, the OECD review is simply a form of non-
binding consultation between OECD officials and the reviewed
country.
The OECD surveillance scheme reviews a number of areas of a
nation's policies, including economic and trade policy, fiscal and social
affairs, and agricultural policy.' 97 This article will focus on the trade
policy review scheme, which covers the same substantive material as
the TPRM. The OECD Member States have, according to article
3(a), a duty "to furnish the Organisation with the information neces-
sary for the accomplishment of its tasks."' 98 Accordingly, they can-
not refuse to be reviewed without violating their international law
obligation. This OECD article is comparable to article IV of the IMF
statute. While Member States ostensibly have some discretionary
power regarding the disclosure of information - such disclosure must
be "necessary for the accomplishment of OECD tasks" - in practice,
the OECD unilaterally determines what is necessary for the accom-
plishment of its tasks. Normally, the OECD asks for more informa-
tion through its questionnaires than may be technically necessary in
order to prepare its reports. 99
The OECD trade policy review is conducted by a specialized body
called the Trade Committee. The Trade Committee sits atop a pyra-
mid of working parties and groups of experts who deal with trade pol-
icy review. 2°° The purposes of the trade policy review are to identify
the main problems and tendencies emerging in international trade, and
195. H.A.H. Audretsch, Supervision Within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, in SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS,
supra note 132, at 590.
196. Id. at 525.
197. For a complete list of OECD surveillance activities, see id. at 540.
198. Convention, supra note 191, art. 3(1).
199. Audretsch, supra note 195, at 532.
200. See id. at 540 (analytical presentation of the working bodies and the groups of experts).
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to provide Member States with solutions. 20 1 The ultimate aim is to
promote some form of policy coordination among Member States. 20 2
The trade policy review takes place annually and is published as part
of the overall yearly economic survey of the Member State. While
national economic policy commands significant attention, these
surveys dedicate a special chapter to national trade policy.20 3 The
surveys employ cautious language, however, and the most trenchant
criticism of national policies remains behind closed doors. 2°4
Two successive surveys on U.S. trade policy - the 1988-89 sur-
vey 205 and the 1989-90 survey 206 -,can be cited as examples for the
above propositions. The 1988-89 survey stresses the strong commit-
ment of the United States to the successful completion of the Uruguay
Round and to the recently concluded bilateral Free Trade Agreement
with Canada. The survey expresses the opinion that bilateral treaties
can be helpful in strengthening the multilateral system, implying that
the OECD will not dismiss bilateral treaties out-of-hand, but rather
will judge them by their actual effect on the multilateral system. The
OECD survey takes notice of the strengthened retaliatory authority
that the competent bodies in the United States, such as the USTR,
have now acquired under the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act, especially by means of the Section 301 procedure (encom-
passing Super 301).207 The survey, however, does not comment on
Section 301's compatibility with international law. It also takes notice
of the increased U.S. government intervention in specific high-technol-
ogy sectors - intervention that is occurring at the same time the
United States has been criticizing other Member States for their in-
volvement in high-technology sectors.
In the 1989-90 survey the language is similar, although some rec-
ommendations are more straightforward. The report takes notice of
the bilateral initiatives of the United States, with special reference to
201. An example of a solution is the work in the OECD on the Producer Subsidy Equivalent
(PSE), a device used to measure subsidies and other support to the agricultural sector. The PSE
was used by the agriculture group in the Uruguay Round. OECD Farmers and Agricultural
Policies, THE OECD OBSERVER, Aug.-Sept. 1987, at 5-9; Agricultural Reform: A Long Row to
Hoe, THE OECD OBSERVER, June-July 1988, at 16-19.
202. On the basic concepts of economic policy coordination in the OECD context, see ERIC
STEIN & PETER HAY, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 928-31 (1967).
203. ROBERTSON, supra note 189, at 85; Audretsch, supra note 195, at 535.
204. Audretsch, supra note 195, at 531.
205. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD Eco-
NOMIC SURVEYS 1988-89, UNITED STATES 98-102 (1989).
206. ORGANISATION FOR EONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD Eco-
NOMIC SURVEYS 1989-90, UNITED STATES 56 (1990).
207. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1301 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(1988)).
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the Strategic Impediments Initiative (SII) negotiations held with Ja-
pan, and expresses concern that an element of managed trade could
creep into bilateral treaties. The report recognizes that the United
States acted in that year to limit government involvement in promot-
ing new technologies. It also suggests that the origins of the U.S. trade
deficit are largely macroeconomic and that trade policy should not be
used to address problems with the trade deficit. Although the report
does not go further, it clearly disagrees with U.S. views that illicit
trade practices by other countries were an influential factor in the en-
largement of the trade deficit. 20 8 Thus, from an analysis of the muted
tone of the surveys, one can conclude that the OECD trade policy
review scheme is a "soft" form of review. The trade policy review is
also of secondary importance to the economic policy review in the
OECD yearly surveys. However, no matter how "soft" the review
may be, Member States are still obligated to undergo it.
Both the IMF and OECD surveillance schemes follow the same
pattern. The organizations conduct a fact-finding process based on
information they receive, sometimes by utilizing new questionnaires.
On the basis of this information, the organizations' officials consult
with the Member States and make a decision or recommendation. A
common denominator in the two schemes, apart from their procedural
similarity, is that Member States are legally bound to undergo review.
This requirement has led in practice to a trusting relationship between
the Member States and the particular organization. In addition, the
Member States benefit from the high quality reviews they receive. Un-
dergoing review and becoming stronger in the process is consistent
with the growing interdependence in international relations. Trans-
parency of national policies is a prerequisite for policy coordination,
harmonization, and smooth international relations.
V. AN ASSESSMENT
The principal feature of the international economic order built af-
ter World War II is, as Barents has noted, "the normative nature
given to the principle of comparative advantage in international
trade. ' ' 2°9 The numerous exceptions from GATT regulations -
granted for practically any reason to the Contracting Parties - have
undermined the applicability of the GATT and, to a certain extent,
208. The former U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter, however, stated that illicit
trade practices were not the main cause of what was a huge trade deficit at the time. Yeutter
Defends U.S. Use of Section 301, EEP Before Australian Media Group, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
47 (Jan. 13, 1988).
209. Barents, supra note 161, at 359.
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prevented the Contracting Parties from achieving the gains that would
result from an optimal distribution of labor at the world level. The
attempts to strengthen the GATT regime should address this prob-
lem. 210 Hence, the TPRM's contribution to the GATT must be as-
sessed according to this criterion.
As stated earlier, current surveillance schemes perform three dis-
tinctive functions: a review function, a corrective function, and a crea-
tive function. 21' The review function consists primarily of comparing
a national policy instrument with an international standard and mak-
ing a judgment as to whether the policy instrument conforms to the
international standard. Of course, there is a separate question of how
specific such a judgment can be, that is, whether such judgment can
and should make a point-by-point, or section-by-section, judgment of
a national policy's compatibility with international rules. Neverthe-
less, the three supervision schemes examined in this article perform
this review function - the IMF more strictly, and the OECD and the
GATT less so.,
The corrective function consists of recommending a change in na-
tional policy when a national policy instrument is found to be contrary
to the international legal obligations of the reviewed country. The re-
ports and decisions issued during review by the international organiza-
tions surveyed in this article vary in their binding character. The
OECD and the GATT issue mere recommendations while the IMF, in
the case of stand-by arrangements, issues legally binding demands for
compliance. This does not mean, however, that recommendatory
schemes produce no legal effects. The absence of binding force does
not amount to the absence of legal character.
The creative function can be described in the following manner.
Practice has proved, especially in the context of international organi-
zations, that some legal rules are vague and can lead to different inter-
pretations or, in the case of a long-standing rule, to outdated
interpretations. In these cases, international organizations tend to
provide interpretation through their surveillance schemes; this supple-
mental interpretation is the creative function at work. Interpretation
through surveillance occurs in the IMF and the OECD and could be
210. Roessler points out in a more elaborate form that the function of GATT as a negotiating
forum is to enable countries to defend their national economic interests, not as against other
countries, but as against sectional interests within their own and other countries. Frieder Roes-
sler, The Scope, Limits and Functions of the GATT Legal System, 8 WORLD ECON. 287, 297
(1985).
211. See G.J.H. van Hoof & K. de Vey Mestdagh, Supervisory Mechanisms in International
Economic Organizations, in SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGA-
NIZATIONS, supra note 132, at 3, 11.
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used to strengthen the GATT surveillance scheme, if properly exer-
cised through the TPRM. The creative function, as noted in Part III
of this article, is closely related to the review function because interna-
tional rules must be interpreted before a country's compatibility with
international obligations can be judged. 212 The mere decision whether
to apply a rule to a specific case requires interpreting whether that rule
is indeed applicable to the particular case. Thus, the surveillance
schemes examined involve characteristics of all three of these func-
tions. Because international organizations do not apply different in-
struments for each function, the review schemes are broad enough to
perform all three.213
The three distinct functions are performed by the TPRM, albeit
incompletely. The TPRM has been particularly reluctant to make
pronouncements regarding the compatibility of national policies with
GATT rules, or to recommend to the Contracting Parties appropriate
policies that will bring each Contracting Party within GATT objec-
tives. 214 Thus, on the "softness" of its review, GATT's TPRM seems
to have been influenced by the OECD scheme. The GATT has been
influenced by the OECD even though, theoretically, the OECD should
have less influence on the GATT than the IMF because the GATT
and the OECD differ more in form and substance than do the GATT
and the IMF. Unlike the OECD, the GATT is not a forum for negoti-
ations leading eventually to some form of coordination of national pol-
icies on selected issues. The GATT is, rather, an international
organization entrusted with the liberalization of world trade. 215 Be-
cause the subject matter of the GATT is concrete, it should seek Mem-
ber States' compliance with its rules. The pragmatism that has always
reigned at GATT, however, has been a barrier to such a perspective.
The fact that the TPRM was only recently introduced is probably an-
other reason for its somewhat meek character.
A legal purist will be disappointed with the overall performance of
212. See id., supra note 211, at 12.
213. Cf John H. Jackson, Role of Supervisory Mechanisms in the Restructuring of the Inter-
national Economic Order, in RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE
ROLE OF LAW AND LAWYERS 163, 164 (Pieter van Dijk et al. eds., 1987) (noting that interna-
tional supervisory mechanisms include a wide variety of institutional methods to review, correct,
and create international standards).
214. This reluctance occurs notwithstanding the fact that GATT officials, especially in the
case of the EC report, clearly showed their dissatisfaction with EC policies.
215. Technically, the GATT is not an international organization, but a mere protocol of
provisional application. However, because of the failure of the ITO, the GATT has emerged as
the main de facto international organization for the liberalization of world trade. Its constitu-
tional deficiencies appear not to have impeded its remarkable evolution. Cf JACKSON & DA-
VEY, supra note 7, at 292-96 (GATT's organizational deficiencies may have affected the GATT).
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the TPRM. The review function is inadequate because the GATT re-
port refuses to state clearly the grounds of incompatibility of national
legislation with GATT rules. The corrective and creative functions
are also inadequate because GATT reports have not been daring
enough to recommend abolishing incompatible national trade policy
instruments. The GATT reports have not been able to fulfill the cor-
rective and creative functions because the reports do not provide a
more straightforward interpretation of GATT rules.
However, while the overall performance of the TPRM may be un-
satisfactory, the TPRM has still had some impact. Although the Con-
tracting Parties had agreed that the TPRM would not be the basis for
imposition of legal obligations, the EC reacted very seriously to criti-
cism of its policies by the GATT under the TPRM. If the EC had
been more politically astute, it would have recognized that to under-
mine the TPRM's importance, it should have ignored the TPRM
rather than reacted violently to it. But as it stands, their strong reac-
tion to the TPRM has given extra credence to the TPRM. One would
not expect such a reaction to a report deprived of binding character.
The TPRM also has effect because criticism of a national trade policy
expressed in the report "legitimizes" criticism expressed by other par-
ties. For example, the GATT report on the EC, which concluded that
the EC Common Agricultural Policy constitutes a barrier to the liber-
alization of world trade of agricultural products, legitimized criticisms
that had been expressed against the Policy. 2 16 Criticism of the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy is no longer simply the criticism of another
Contracting Party, but instead expresses the corresponding view of the
GATT. In addition, if at some time after the GATT EC report a
GATT panel is convened to examine the compatibility of specific
Common Agricultural Policy mechanisms with GATT rules, the
panel will likely be influenced by the findings of the GATT report.
Thus, the GATT report can exercise a persuasive effect on subsequent
GATT practice. 217
This legitimizing effect should not be underestimated. A Con-
tracting Party that argues for the abolishment of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy can now rely on the GATT critique, thus
strengthening the claim and thereby putting more pressure on the EC.
The legitimizing effect can also be seen in the EC criticism of U.S.
trade instruments during discussion of the U.S. TPRM review. The
European Community implied that the United States should modify
216. GATT REPORT ON THE EC, supra note 23, at 8-11, 158-85.
217. Jackson follows this approach as far as the precedent-setting effect of previous panel
findings on subsequent panel decisions. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 90.
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those instruments that had been found incompatible with GATT
rules.
As Barents rightly concludes, negative integration is achieved
through market forces, while positive integration presupposes some
form of government involvement. 218 According to this perspective,
government involvement ultimately means reduction of the exercise of
national sovereignty in favor of that of an international organization.
Unlike other more integrated international organizations, the GATT
does not require harmonization. 21 9  Therefore, establishment of a
"level playing field" is even more important in the GATT, and thus
should be a current prime objective. 220 If nothing else, the history of
the GATT has shown that the lack of a "level playing field" can elimi-
nate substantial gains from the liberalization of world trade.
The GATT has, of course, already affected national policies to a
certain extent. 22' The GATT should now shift from primarily trying
to affect national trade policies, to emphasizing compliance with inter-
nationally determined rules. The TPRM is a step, albeit a short one,
in this direction. The first step toward mandating compliance is the
introduction of an article to the GATT comparable to article 5 of the
EEC Treaty. As previously discussed, both the IMF and the OECD
schemes contain provisions obligating Member States to collaborate
with the organizations, thereby providing a legal vehicle to ensure ef-
fective surveillance schemes.222 Also, as discussed earlier, a legal obli-
gation to collaborate is not provided by either article X or article XXV
of the GATT. 223 Such a requirement cannot be created by long-stand-
ing practice because, except for very specific areas, international eco-
218. Barents, supra note 161, at 362.
219. The EEC is an example of an organization that imposes a harmonization obligation.
See PIETER V. VAN THEMAAT, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW: A CONTRIBUTION OF LEGAL HISTORY, OF COMPARATIVE LAW AND OF GENERAL
LEGAL THEORY TO THE DEBATE ON A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 336 (1981).
On the evolution of the respective EEC provisions in the Single European Act, see JEAN DE
RUYT, L'ACTE UNIQUE EUROPEEN 166 (1987).
220. For an explanation of "level playing field," see JACKSON, supra note 9, at 17.
221. On this question, see Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Func-
tions of the Law of International Trade, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501, 522 (1985); Robert E. Hudec,
GA TT or GABB? The Future Design of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE
L.J. 1299, 1314 n.36 (1971). Some countries have even changed their legislation because of that
legislation's incompatibility with GATT rules. The United States, for example, has changed
legislation as a result of an adverse GATT panel decision in the DISC case. See Jackson, supra
note 159, at 50. For information on the DISC case in GATT, see John H. Jackson, The Jurispru-
dence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (1978); see also
Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72
MINN. L. REV. 1443 (1988).
222. See discussion supra Part IV.
223. See discussion supra Part III.
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nomic law is predominantly treaty law and customary rules evolve
only with difficulty. 224 For example, according to some scholars, even
the MFN clause, a cornerstone of the GATT, is not a rule of custom-
ary international law. 225 Thus, irrespective of how far-reaching a col-
laboration requirement in the GATT should be, such a requirement
should at least provide a legal basis for the TPRM or its future incar-
nation to function. 226
The Contracting Parties have decided to continue the TPRM in
1992.227 This decision is evidence of an existing consensus among the
Contracting Parties to pursue the TPRM in its current form. The
form, however, is not all that matters in international law, as nothing
precludes countries from invoking opiniojuris even against soft law.228
Judging by the EC's reaction to the GATT TPRM report criticism,
even in soft form, is intolerable to some of the most influential Con-
tracting Parties to the GATT. A TPRM that urges ex ante control of
national trade policy must not be delayed for the future. Contracting
Parties committed to the strengthening of the GATT and the multilat-
eral regime should keep this in mind.
Three different proposals can be advanced to serve as first steps
toward a rule-oriented approach to the GATT. First, to eliminate the
abuses of some Contracting Parties, qualification as a developed or
developing country for GATT purposes could be made dependent on
the findings of a periodic TPRM review. Thus if a country can no
longer objectively be classified as a "developing country," it will lose
developing country status and the attendant advantages conferred by
the GATT. In this way, Contracting Parties will be forced to assume
their proper share of responsibility for the regulation of world trade.
Second, the TPRM can be used to monitor trade protection meas-
ures better. Measures authorized by the GATT can more easily be
distinguished from measures that are simply tolerated by the GATT.
For example, VRAs should be closely examined by the TPRM review-
ing body. The European Community and the United States, which
224. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 22; see also Stephan Zamora, Is There Customary Interna-
tional Economic Law?, 32 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 9, 34 (1989).
225. See JACKSON, supra note 9, at 134; see also Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of the Thirtieth Session, U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/33/10
(1978) (the work of the International Law Commission on this subject).
226. See Jackson, supra note 159, at 215 (noting a continuing trend toward a rule-oriented
approach in international relations, part of which arguably is conforming national policies to
GATT rules).
227. Trade Policy Review Mechanism Programme of Reviews for 1992, GATT Doc. L/6887
(July 17, 1991).
228. Still, as Jackson points out, international organizations should be prepared for the worst
possible scenario. See Jackson, supra note 159, at 217.
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conclude most VRAs, are subject to review every two years, and there-
fore, the TPRM provides a means for making timely assessments of
the evolution of VRAs.229 The performance criteria of the IMF can
provide a source of inspiration for the GATT to create its own per-
formance criteria to periodically review VRAs in order to proceed
more effectively in the gradual elimination of such restraints.
National trade policy is not independent, but is part of a nation's
overall economic policy. The economic history of the world shows
that countries with economic or financial problems invariably resort to
protectionism. Improved functioning of the world system depends
partly on strengthening the ties between the IMF, the OECD, and the
GATT. Thus, the third proposal is for the TPRM to provide a report
on national trade policies while the IMF provides an assessment of
monetary policy, and the OECD provides an assessment of overall
economic policy and development trends in particular countries. In
this way, all three reports, when read together, will provide a complete
report of national trade policies in the context of overall economic
policies.
In its present form, the TPRM will serve only as a means of en-
hanced transparency because GATT's dispute settlement procedures
are currently the only way to legally determine compatibility of
national policies with GATT rules.230 Still, in the words of GATT
Director-General Arthur Dunkel, the TPRM is a long-term enter-
prise.231 As such, if the TPRM progresses to become a more inte-
grated scheme, the boundary between transparency and legal
assessment will become more indistinguishable and, ultimately, the
latter will replace the former.
Henkin characterizes the GATT legal system as primitive and
"struggling to achieve some measure of regulation which all admit to
be essential. ' 232 The negotiating group on the FOGS proved him
right; as discussed above, the TPRM, as it stands now, is a policy re-
view mechanism that fails to argue along legal lines. 233 In the future it
229. The EC and the United States are two of the few entities that have the economic power
to impose VRAs.
230. See GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARRIFS AND TRADE, TRADE POLICY REVIEW: Aus-
TRALIA 3-4 (Mar. 1990) (introductory remarks by the Director-General of the GATT, Mr. Ar-
thur Dunkel) [hereinafter Comments of Dunkel]; cf Qureshi, supra note 12, at 159; cf also Price,
supra note 24, at 235.
231. Comments of Dunkel, supra note 230, at 3.
232. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 R.C.A.D.I. 19,
191 (1989); see also C. MICHAEL AHO & JONATHAN D. ARONSON, TRADE TALKS: AMERICA
BETTER LISTEN 46 (1985).
233. Jackson has characterized the FOGS's approach as "cautious." JOHN H. JACKSON,
RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 91 (1990).
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should become a more balanced scheme, a hybrid of policy review and
legal argumentation, providing a basis for bringing national "policies
into conformity with what is perceived to be the collective interest. '234
A rule-oriented approach can probably start here.
CONCLUSION
For the moment, GATT's trade policy review mechanism is essen-
tially a mechanism to provide enhanced transparency in the GATT
system. The history of GATT - progressing from article X, through
the Understanding, and now to the TPRM - clearly demonstrates the
GATT's self-expressed need for enhanced transparency in multilateral
trade relations. In other international organizations, surveillance
schemes are not limited to the pursuit of transparency - but in the
GATT and its current TPRM, transparency is the lone goal. This is
so because the Contracting Parties intended that the TPRM be limited
to addressing transparency deficiencies. Furthermore, if required to
analyze the consistency of national policies with the General Agree-
ment in a trade policy review, the GATT Secretariat would be called
upon to authoritatively interpret the General Agreement. But that
power to conclusively interpret the General Agreement is placed ex-
clusively with the Contracting Parties; thus, the TPRM must be
viewed as limited to the pursuit of transparency. This argument must
not be taken to its extreme, however, because doing so could well de-
prive the TPRM of all its functions.
Recognition should be given now to the desirability of shifting the
TPRM, in the future, from a mere policy review scheme to a more
balanced review that incorporates into its present, limited mandate a
dose of legalistic argument. Though desirable, this shift is not for the
present, nor probably even for the immediate future, in light of the
reigning pragmatism in the GATT. Despite this, in the short-run the
TPRM can provide effective monitoring of existing trade protection.
Those who favor a law-oriented approach to the GATT should care-
fully consider the possibilities that the TPRM has created, because it is
through their own behavior that the Contracting Parties must provide
rationalism in international trade relations.
234. Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, GATT Surveillance of Trade Related Policies, in THE NEW
GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 12, at 159.
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